A Secure Maturity Model for Protecting e-Government Services: A Case of Tanzania by Mohamed D. Waziri & Zaipuna O. Yonah
A Secure Maturity Model for Protecting 
e-Government Services: A Case of Tanzania 
 
Mohamed D. Waziri
1 and Zaipuna O. Yonah
2 
The Nelson Mandela African Institution of Science and Technology (NM-AIST) 
School of Computational and Communication Science and Engineering 
P. O. Box 447, Arusha, Tanzania 
Email: {dewam
1, zaipuna.yonah
2}@nm-aist.ac.tz  
 
Abstract 
E-Government  Maturity  Models  (eGMMs)  are  widely 
used  in  the  implementation  and  development  of  e-
Government  services.  These  models  outline  various 
stages  for  e-Government  development.  Information 
security  and  privacy  are  considered  as  the  most 
significant  challenges  in  implementing  e-Government 
services, but unfortunately very few designs of eGMMs 
have  considered  security  as  a  specific issue.  However, 
even  these  few  security  responsive  models  consider 
security mostly at the transaction stage, and as such it is 
insecure to depend on security mechanisms provided at 
transaction stage only. This paper develops a four-stage 
holistic  secured  eGMM  for  protecting  e-Government 
services  with  Tanzania  used  as  a  case  study.  The 
proposed secured e-Government maturity model has been 
designed by including the security layers which consist 
of technical and non-technical security related aspects in 
each  of  its  four  maturity  stages.  The  model  design 
process is based on the ISO/ IEC 27002 security standard 
and is guided by a design science research methodology. 
The  paper  main  contribution  is  the  proposed  secured 
eGMM that addresses both technical and non-technical 
security related aspects at its maturity stages. 
Keywords: e-Government Maturity Model, e-Government 
services, security threats, access control, security policy 
1.  Introduction 
E-Government  refers  to  the  use  by  government 
agencies of information technologies (such as Wide 
Area Networks, the Internet and mobile computing) 
that  have  the  ability  to  transform  relations  with 
citizens, businesses and other arms of government 
[1].  The  use  of  Information  and  Communication 
Technologies  (ICTs)  in  government  operations 
facilitates  speedy,  transparent,  accountable, 
efficient and effective interaction with the public, 
citizens,  business  and  other  agencies.  E-
Government  is  a  cost-effective  solution  that 
improves  communication  between  government 
agencies and their constituents by providing access 
to information and services online [2].  
E-Government  has  many  benefits  to  our  modern 
world through services provided over the internet 
as  follows:  (1)  it  increases  transparency,  (2) 
enhancing efficiency and quality, (3) enables  full 
access to information and individual services  [3], 
and  (4)  enables  citizens  to  interact  and  receive 
services from public organizations 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week (24/7 – basis). However, despite 
the  potential  benefits  provided  by  e-Government 
services,  there  are  a  number  of  challenges  that 
could  prevent  achieving  these  expected  benefits. 
The most significant challenges for implementing 
e-Government  initiatives  are  information  security 
and privacy [4]. Typical citizens, especially those 
who  don’t  use  the  Internet  frequently,  feel 
vulnerable when using e-Government services, they 
may have little trust that their information can be 
transmitted  through  websites  securely.  Most  of 
these  citizens  fear  that  government  is  spying  on 
them  and  they  are  not  wishing  to  have  history 
retained.  It  was  observed  that  majority  of  the  e-
Government services users distrust the information 
security  measures  used  to  protect  e-Government 
services [5].  
The  government  of  Tanzania  developed  the  e-
Government strategy in 2009 to facilitate provision 
of sustainable e-Government services to the public, 
particularly to citizens. It is noted in the strategy 
that  during  implementation  of  e-Government 
applications,  consideration  should  be  given  on 
using security and privacy  mechanisms to ensure 
proper  use  and  handling  of  personal  information 
and transactions [6]. Unfortunately, the government 
has not adopted any standard or issued guidelines 
to public organizations with regards to information 
security. 
E-Government Maturity Models are widely used in 
development and implementation of e-Government 
services.  An e-Government maturity model is a set 
of  stages  (from  basic  to  advanced  ones)  that 
determines the maturity of the e-Government [7]. 
The advantage of having a staged approach is the 
ability  to  generate  momentum  that  can  be 
sustained. This allows public sector organizations 
to  attract  more  citizens  to  use  e-Government 
services  to  a  point  where  it  becomes  natural,  as 
well as securing business trust and confidence to 
deal with an e-Government portals as part of their 
standard  service  chain  operations  [8].  The  main 
benefit of maturity models is to offer a way to rank 
e-Government services and a way to enhance their 
quality.  Information  security  and  privacy  are 
considered  as  the  most  significant  challenges  in 
implementing  e-Government  services.  But 
unfortunately  very  few  cases  of  eGMMs  designs 
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Existing  models  consider  security  mostly  at  the 
transaction stage [9], and it is insecure to depend 
only  on  security  mechanisms  provided  at 
transaction stage only. Security mechanisms should 
be considered at all stages of the maturity models. 
This  paper  proposes  a  holistic  secured  e-
Government  Maturity  Model  consisting  of  both 
technical  and  non-technical  security  aspects  for 
protecting  e-Government  services  in  Tanzania. 
With  a  holistic  approach,  security  is  considered 
beyond  the  technical  aspects.  Social,  political, 
cultural, and legal impacts on security requirements 
are considered as well [10].        
A number of Information Security Maturity Models 
(ISMMs)  have  been  developed  with  the  aim  of 
maturity  assessment  of  information  security  and 
evaluation of the level of  security awareness and 
practice (which are affected by people, process, and 
technology) at any ICT-enabled organization, be it 
public or private sector [11]. Furthermore, ISMMs 
help to better understand where and to what extent 
the  three  main  processes  of  security  (prevention, 
detection,  and  recovery)  are  implemented  and 
integrated. Despite the fact that these models rather 
measure quality than quantity of services offered, 
they  also  lack  much  of  non-technical  security 
services [12].  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows: 
Section  two  identifies  the  technical  and  non-
technical security threats which face e-Government 
services  and  presents  the  related  work;  Section 
three  outlines  the  research  methodology;  Section 
four  presents  the  proposed  model;  Lastly, 
conclusion is given in Section five. 
2.  Background 
The ability to make public services easily available 
online  is  an  attractive  prospect  for  governments, 
not just because this gives citizens easy access, but 
also because of the potential cost-savings. But e-
Government services in their current status are not 
secure; they bring benefits but also security threats 
that need to be addressed. E-Government services 
are  vulnerable  to  three  different  categories  of 
attacks: server-side attacks (i.e. on the government 
servers),  client-side  attacks  (i.e.  on  the  citizen’s 
computing/access device) and network attacks (i.e. 
on  the  Internet  connection,  either  by  interfering 
with existing connections/sessions or by an attacker 
pretending to the server to be a valid client or to the 
client  to  be  a  valid  server)  [13].  This  section 
identifies the technical  and non-technical security 
threats which impact e-Government services. 
2.1  Technical  Security  Threats  of  e-
Government Services 
Technical  security  threats  are  those  threats  by 
which  an  attacker  perpetrates  using  software  and 
systems knowledge or expertise. The following are 
the  most  known  technical  security  threats  on  e-
Government services. 
a.  Communication  channel  threats:  The 
Internet serves as the electronic chain that links 
a  consumer  (client)  to  the  e-Government 
server. Messages on the Internet travel through 
random  paths  from  a  source  node  to  a 
destination node. It is impossible to guarantee 
that  every  computer  on  the  Internet  through 
which messages pass is safe, secure and, non-
hostile [14]. 
b.  Server end threats:  A server is a running 
instance of a computer application that accepts 
requests from the client and provides services 
as  the  response  accordingly.  Servers  have 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by anyone 
determined  to  cause  destruction  or  illegally 
acquire  information  [14].  Threats  to  e-
Government  servers  fall  into  two  general 
categories:  (1) Threats from actual attacker(s); 
and (2) Technological failure [15].  In terms of 
the  former,  the  motivation  is  primarily 
psychological.  The intent is to garner personal 
information from people for the sheer purposes 
of exploitation (such as obtaining Credit Card 
and  Bank  Account  information;  Phishing 
schemes, obtaining usernames and passwords, 
etc.).  With the latter, anything related to the 
Internet  can  cause  problems.   This  can  be 
anything  from  a  network  not  configured 
properly to data packets being lost, especially 
in a wireless access environment.  Even poorly 
written  programming  code  upon  which  e-
Government  service  was  developed  can  be 
very susceptible to threats [15].   
c.  Denial of service: (DoS) attacks (loss of 
availability):  The  main  aim  of  DoS  is  the 
disruption  of  services  by  attempting  to  limit 
access  to  a  machine  or  service.  The  most 
common  DoS  attacks  target  the  computer 
network’s bandwidth or connectivity [16]. In 
bandwidth attacks, the network is flooded with 
a  high  volume  of  traffic  leading  to  the 
exhaustion of all available network resources, 
so  that  legitimate  user  requests  cannot  get 
through, resulting in degraded productivity. In 
connectivity  attacks,  a  computer  is  flooded 
with  a  high  volume  of  connection  requests 
leading  to  the  exhaustion  of  all  available 
operating system resources, thus rendering the 
computer  unable  to  process  legitimate  user 
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effective  e-government  services  without 
interruptions in Web access as well as e-mail 
and  database  services,  there  is  a  need  for 
protection against DoS attacks.  
d.  Web spoofing: Web spoofing is an electronic 
deception  related  to  the  Internet.  It  occurs 
when the attacker sets up a fake website which 
almost  looks  the  same  with  the  original 
website in order to lure consumers to give their 
credit  card  numbers  or  other  personal 
information  [15].  E-Government  services 
website  should  have  the  capability  to 
authenticate  itself  in  order  to  gain  citizens’ 
trust  and  confidence  towards  the  security  of 
their information.  
e.  IP spoofing: IP address spoofing refers to the 
creation  of  Internet  Protocol  packets  with  a 
forged source IP address, called spoofing. It is 
a  method  of  attacking  a  network  in  order  to 
gain unauthorized access [17]. The intent here 
is to change the source address of a data packet 
to give it the appearance that it originated from 
another  computer.   IP  Spoofing  is  typically 
used to start the launch of a Denial of Service 
Attack [18]. The real attacker is difficult to be 
identified  with  IP  spoofing,  since  all  e-
Government server logs will show connections 
from a legitimate source.   
f.  Spyware  threats:  A  spyware  is  a  serious 
computer security threat. It is any program that 
monitors  users’  online  activities  or  installs 
programs without users consent for profit or to 
capture  personal  Information  [19].  E-
Government  services  should  have  the 
capability to detect and prevent the activities of 
spyware  in  order  to  gain  citizens’  trust  and 
confidence  towards  the  security  mechanisms 
provided by e-Government services. 
g.  Unauthorized  information  access: 
Unauthorized  information  access  attack  has 
two types, the first type is where unauthorized 
users were able to access organizations’ ICTs 
resources. The second type is where authorized 
users  with  limited  access  expand  their 
authorizations  illegally  (e.g.  privilege 
escalation)  [20].  Access  control  constrains 
what a user can do directly, as well as  what 
programs executing on behalf of the users are 
allowed to do. In this way, access control seeks 
to prevent activity that could lead to breach of 
security [21]. 
h.  Loss  of  integrity  (unauthorized 
modification): Integrity  means capability to 
prevent  information  from  unauthorized 
modification,  and  ensuring  that  information 
can  be  relied  upon  and  is  accurate  and 
complete  [22].  Attacks  on  data  integrity 
involve  intentional  or  unintentional 
unauthorized  modifications  of  data  at  some 
point  in  their  life  cycle.  E-Government 
services  should  have  a  capability  to  prevent 
unauthorized  modification  of  information  to 
assure users that the information received are 
not fabricated.  
2.2  Non-Technical  Security  Threats  of  e-
Government Services 
Non-technical security threats are those threats by 
which  an  attacker  uses  chicanery  to  trick  people 
into revealing sensitive information or performing 
actions that compromise the security of a network. 
Non-technical threats include: 
 
a.  Acts of God (Natural Disasters): Nobody 
can  stop  nature  from  taking  its  course. 
Earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, lightning, and 
fire  can  cause  severe  damage  to  computer 
systems. Information can be lost, downtime or 
loss of productivity can occur, and damage to 
hardware  can  disrupt  other  essential  services 
[23].  Few  safeguards  can  be  implemented 
against natural disasters. The best approach is 
to  have  disaster  recovery  and  contingency 
plans in place.  
b.  Physical  infrastructure  attacks:  Physical 
infrastructure  attacks  are  attacks  that  directly 
target  physical  equipments  of  ICT  assets. 
These  attacks  can  be  in  a  form  of  theft  or 
damage of hardware, software or other devices 
on  or  over  which  information  is  stored  or 
transmitted. This could lead to permanent loss 
or unauthorized access to critical information. 
This type of attacks can cause unavailability of 
e-Government services. Access points such as 
delivery  and  loading  areas  and  other  points 
where  unauthorized  users  may  enter  the 
premises  of  the  organization  should  be 
controlled  and,  if  possible,  isolated  from 
information  processing  facilities  to  avoid 
unauthorized access. 
c.  Internal  staff  irregularities  and  illegal 
operations:  Internal  staffs  are  frequently 
making unintentional errors that contribute to 
security  problems,  directly  or  indirectly. 
Sometimes  these  errors  can  become  threats, 
such as a data entry error or a programming 
error  that  crashes  a  system.  To  reduce  staff 
irregularities  and  illegal  operations, 
organizations  should  conduct  security 
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periodically. 
d.  Social engineering and phishing attacks: 
Social  engineering  attacks  are  usually 
conducted  by  hackers  who  use  a  variety  of 
psychological tricks to get the computer user to 
give them the information they need to access 
a  computer  or  network  [24].  Social 
Engineering is the art of exploiting the weakest 
link  of  information  security  systems:  the 
people  who  are  using  them.  Victims  are 
deceived  in  order  to  release  information  or 
perform  a  malicious  action  on  behalf  of  the 
attacker  [25].  This  attack  might  involve 
gaining  the  confidence  of  individuals  with 
access  to  secure  information,  tricking  them 
into  thinking  there  is  a  legitimate  request  to 
access  secures  information;  physical 
observation;  and  eavesdropping  on  people  at 
work.  Social  Engineering  provides  hackers 
with  efficient  short  cuts,  and  in  many  cases 
facilitates  attacks  that  would  not  be  possible 
through other means [26]. On the other hand, 
phishing can be thought of as the marriage of 
social  engineering  and  technology  [27]. 
Phishing is a form of online identity theft that 
aims to steal sensitive information from users 
such  as  online  banking  passwords  and  credit 
card information [28]. For example, an attacker 
may  send  email  seemingly  from  a  reputable 
credit  card  company  or  financial  institution 
that  requests  account  information,  often 
suggesting that there is a problem. When users 
respond  with  the  requested  information, 
attackers  can  use  it  to  gain  access  to  the 
accounts.  Security  awareness  training  and 
education  programs  are  considered  as  the 
effective  security  countermeasures  towards 
social engineering and phishing attacks. 
2.3  Objectives 
The general objective of the study reported in this 
paper  was  to  develop  a  holistic  secured  e-
Government  Maturity  Model  for  protecting  e- 
Government  services  with  Tanzania  as  a  case 
study.  Specific  objectives  of  this  study  were  as 
follows: 
a.  To identify technical security threats of e-
Government services. 
b.  To identify non-technical security threats 
of e-Government services. 
c.  To  design  a  holistic  secured  maturity 
model  for  protecting  e-Government 
services, Tanzania as a case study. 
2.4  Related Work 
There are several maturity models of e-Government 
services  that  exist  today.  The  design  of  these 
models,  however,  do  not  consider  security  as  a 
specific  issue.  Most  of  these  models  consider 
security  at  the  transaction  stage  [9].  Various 
researchers  proposed  different  methods  and 
systems  to  provide  security  in  e-Government 
services.  In  [29],  Mwakalinga  proposed  an 
integrated  security  system  for  e-Government 
services.  This  security  system  provides  multiple 
authorization  schemes,  information  integrity 
schemes and digital signature schemes. The system 
integrates  a  registration  system,  a  certification 
system, an authorization system, and a smart card 
system.  It  is  based  on  the  Security  Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) standard, which is an 
XML-based  framework  for  exchanging  security 
information.  The  system  can  be  integrated  in 
existing e-Government systems and can be built-in 
in new e-Government systems [29]. However, the 
system neither provides denial of service security 
service  nor  support  e-Government  wireless 
services’  security.  The  system  has  not  yet  been 
implemented  and  so  there  are  no  results  on  its 
performance [29].  
In their paper [30], Edwards et al. propose a model 
that integrates security into eGMMs at the various 
stages  with  an  e-Government  System  Security 
Model  (eGSSM).  The  eGSSM  is  a  theoretical 
framework, which is multidimensional in construct 
and employs a risk-based approach to integrating 
security into eGMMs. The key component to this 
model is the e-Government Maturity Trigger. This 
trigger assesses a government’s ability to address 
Key Domain Areas within the e-Government Stage 
Process  Maturity  (eGSPM)  and  mitigate  security 
risk using the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Risk Management Framework (NIST 
RMF) in the e-Government Security Risk Maturity 
(eGSRM). Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and 
Control  (DMAIC)  principles  are  applied  for 
measuring,  controlling  and  reporting  process 
performance, to achieve an optimal capability level 
that will trigger maturity and onward progression to 
the successive stages. The model depends  on risk 
management approach, and hence, none of the non-
technical  security  cotrols  were  considered  in  its 
development phases.   
In  the  Tanzanian  context  reported  in  [12,  31], 
Karokola et al. propose a framework for securing e-
Government  services.  The  framework  was 
developed by integrating IT security services into 
e-Government  Maturity  Model  (eGMM)  critical 
stages. The identified critical stages of the proposed 
eGMM  are  as  follows:  (1)  web  presence;  (2) 
interaction; (3) transaction; (4) transformation; and 
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was  a  result  of  integrating  Information  Security 
Maturity  Model  (ISMM)  critical  levels  into  e-
Government  Maturity  Model  (eGMM)  critical 
stages [12]. The identified critical levels of ISMM 
are  as  follows:  (1)  undefined;  (2)  defined;  (3) 
managed;  (4)  controlled;  and  (5)  optimized.  The 
framework  addresses  both  technical  and  non-
technical security services within the critical stages 
of eGMM. The security strengths of the framework 
depend  upon  the  security  services  requirements 
control areas (SCRAs) available in the framework. 
Unfortunately,  the  design  of  those  SCRAs  are 
complicated in such a way that it is difficult to be 
translated  into  actions  by  the  personnel  at  the 
operational level.  
In  our  proposed  model,  we  simplify  the  task  of 
translating into actions the security related aspects 
required  by  e-Government  services  by  including 
the security layers which consist of technical and 
non-technical security related aspects at each of the 
four  proposed  critical  stages  of  the  model  as 
described in Section 4.  
3.  Methodology 
The  desk  review  was  conducted  to  identify 
technical  and  non-technical  security  threats  to  e-
Government services. Information security articles 
and  journal  papers  were  analyzed  to  extract  the 
mentioned  threats  as  a  part  of  the  extensive 
research background as mentioned in Sections 2.1 
and 2.2; the third research objective was to design a 
holistic secured e-Government maturity model for 
protecting e-Government  services.  Since our case 
study is e-Government in Tanzania context, and we 
observed  that  e-Government  in  Tanzania  adopts 
Gartner’s  four  stage  maturity  model  [6],  the 
proposed secured maturity model for protecting e-
Government  services  was  designed  by  including 
security layers which consist of technical and non-
technical security related aspects in each of its four 
stages  (presence,  interaction,  transaction  and 
transformation). The model designing process was 
done  based  on  the  ISO/  IEC  27002  security 
standard and guided by a Design Science Research 
Methodology (DSR) [32]. The applied DSR steps 
were:  problem  identification  and  motivation, 
definition  of  the  objectives  for  a  solution, 
developing  the  model  [32].  Design  Science 
Research  methodology  was  chosen  because  it 
focuses  on  the  development  and  performance  of 
(designed)  artifacts  with  the  explicit  intention  of 
improving  the  functional  performance  of  the 
artifact [33].  
4.  The Proposed Model 
E-Government services development is guided by 
the so called maturity models that outline various 
stages for e-Government development. In order to 
achieve a secure e-Government services delivery, 
we  recommend  security  related  aspects  to  be 
addressed  as  a  specific  issue  at  various  maturity 
models stages and not just at the transaction stage 
[5, 34]. However, no stage is immune to security 
related issues. This means that there is potential for 
security being a significant component impacting e-
Government  at  all  stages  of  the  maturity  levels. 
This  therefore  calls  for  security  to  be  equally 
addressed  at  every  stage  of  the  e-Government 
maturity  model.  The  proposed  secured  e-
Government maturity model consists of four layers, 
namely:  (1)  secured  digital  presence,  (2)  secured 
interaction, (3) secured transaction, and (4) secured 
transformation.  The  implementation  of  the 
proposed  model  is  neither  based  on  a  specific 
technology/protocol  nor  a  certain  security 
system/product, but rather an approach towards a 
structured  and  efficient  implementation  of  those 
technologies. We summarize the proposed secured 
e-Government maturity model in Table 1. The table 
shows the security layers to be included into the 
model.  The  security  layers  include  technical  and 
non-technical  security  control  elements.  The 
proposed security layers are further described in the 
following paragraphs. 
a.  Secured Digital Presence 
This stage involves simple provision of government 
information  through  website  (static)  with  basic 
information that the citizen can access [9]. This is a 
one-way  communication  between  governments, 
businesses and citizens. Generally, the information 
provided by organizations at this stage are public 
and normally with zero security. At this stage, the 
security layer should have the ability to verify e-
Government services identity in order to build trust 
between government agencies and users. The users 
would like to be sure that they are connected to the 
e-Government  service  belonging  to  the 
administration in question [35]. The most important 
security  related  aspects  to  be  considered  at  this 
stage  are  information  availability  and  entity 
authentication.  These  aspects  can  be  obtained 
through both technical and  non-technical  security 
controls. Security practices to be considered at this 
stage are shown in Table 1. The security controls at 
this stage aim at preventing unauthorized physical 
access or interference with the organization or ICT 
equipments and information assets.  
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At this  stage the interaction  between  government 
and  the  public  (Government-to-Citizens  and 
Government-to- 
Businesses) is stimulated by various applications. 
Citizens can ask questions via e-mail, use search 
engines and download forms and documents [36]. 
The communication is performed in two ways, but 
the interactions are relatively simple and generally 
revolve around information provision. At this stage, 
the  security  layer  should  have  the  ability  to 
authenticate a user/ citizen asking for a service. The 
most  important  security  aspects  at  this  stage  are 
identity  authentication,  availability  and  integrity. 
These  aspects  can  be  achieved  through  the 
implementation of all security practices required at 
secured  digital  presence  stage  together  with  the 
implementation of database security controls, audit 
management  and  the  presence  of  the  adequate 
bandwidth capacity. Other security practices to be 
considered at this stage are also shown in Table 1. 
c.  Secured Transaction 
At  this  stage  public  organizations  provide 
electronic initiatives and services with capabilities 
and features that facilitate clients to complete their 
transactions in full without the necessity of visiting 
government offices [37]. The public can carry out 
their  financial  transactions  with  the  government. 
Such  services  also  allow  the  government  to 
function  in  a  24/7  mode.  The  most  important 
security  aspects  at  this  stage  are  personal 
information confidentiality, identity authentication, 
availability,  non-repudiation,  accountability  and 
integrity.  At  this  stage,  the  security  layer  should 
include  the  implementation  of  certificate/  digital 
signature and secure data transmission in order to 
achieve  data  integrity  and  confidentiality  of 
citizens’  personal  information.  The  exchanged 
message  should  be  encrypted  in  order  to  ensure 
their confidentiality. The data contained in the e-
Government  services  and  exchanged  between  the 
different  government  agencies  must  remain 
confidential.  Other  security  practices  to  be 
considered at this stage are as well shown in Table 
1. 
d.  Secured Transformation 
This stage allows users of e-Government services 
to interact with government as one entity instead of 
individual  government  organizations  [6]. 
Information systems are integrated, and the citizens 
can  get  services  at  one  virtual  counter.  The 
integration  of  information  systems  can  result  in 
situations where the privacy of individual citizens 
is in danger. The most important security aspects of 
this stage are personal information confidentiality, 
identity  authentication,  availability,  non-
repudiation,  accountability  and  integrity.  At  this 
stage,  the  security  layer  should  restrict  the 
utilization of personal information, and secure such 
information from access by unintended parties. A 
government agency should be able to authenticate 
another government agency that requires a service 
on behalf of the users. The security layer should 
also have the capability of filtering service access, 
because some agencies will not have the right to 
invoke  a  certain  service  while  others  do.  At  this 
stage  access  control  mechanisms  should  be 
implemented together with other security practices 
as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Mapping matrix of ISO/ IEC 27002 domains and the Secured e-Government Maturity Model 
(SeGMM) 
SN 
Domain Name  Domain Security Control Elements 
SeGMM (Scope of 
Applicability) 
Layer 
Non-Technical Security Control Elements  1  2  3  4 
1  Risk  Assessment  and 
Treatment 
Assessing security risks  √  √  √  √ 
Treating security risks  √  √  √  √ 
2  Security Policy  Information security policy  √  √  √  √ 
3  Organization  of 
Information Security 
Internal organization  √  √  √  √ 
Security of third parties access  √  √  √  √ 
Security outsourcing  √  √  √  √ 
4  Assets Management 
Accountability for Assets  √  √  √  √ 
Information classification      √  √ 
5  Human Resource Security 
Security prior to employment  √  √  √  √ 
Security during employment  √  √  √  √ 
Security after change of employment  √  √  √  √ 
Security awareness, training, and education  √  √  √  √ 
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Environmental Security 
Secure areas  √  √  √  √ 
Equipment security  √  √  √  √ 
7 
Communications  and 
Operations  Management 
Security 
Operational procedures and responsibilities  √  √  √  √ 
Third party service delivery management  √  √  √  √ 
Systems planning and acceptance  √  √  √  √ 
Media handling security      √  √ 
8  Access Control 
Business Requirement for access control    √  √  √ 
User responsibilities    √  √  √ 
Mobile computing and teleworking  √  √  √  √ 
9 
Information  Systems 
Acquisitions, Development 
and Maintenance 
Security requirements of systems  √  √  √  √ 
Security  in  development  and  support 
processes 
√  √  √  √ 
10  Information  Security 
Incident Management 
Reporting security events and weaknesses  √  √  √  √ 
Management  of  security  incidents  and 
improvements 
√  √  √  √ 
11  Business  Continuity 
Management 
Disaster Recovery Planning  √  √  √  √ 
12  Compliance 
Compliance with legal requirements      √  √ 
Compliance  with  security  policies  and 
standards 
√  √  √  √ 
Information systems audit considerations      √  √ 
Technical Security Control Elements 
1 
Communications  and 
Operations  Management 
Security 
Protection against malicious software  √  √  √  √ 
Back-up  √  √  √  √ 
Network security management  √  √  √  √ 
Exchange of information       √  √ 
Electronic services security    √  √  √ 
Monitoring system  √  √  √  √ 
2  Access Control 
User access management  √  √  √  √ 
Network access control    √  √  √ 
Operating systems access control  √  √  √  √ 
Application and information access control      √  √ 
3 
Information  Systems 
Acquisitions, Development 
and Maintenance 
Security in processing application       √  √ 
Cryptographic controls    √  √  √ 
Security of system files      √  √ 
Technical Vulnerability Management  √  √  √  √ 
4  Technical  Security 
Controls 
Encryption tools      √  √ 
Authentication tools    √  √  √ 
Access control tools  √  √  √  √ 
Digital signatures  √  √  √  √ 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, development of a holistic secured e-
Government  Maturity  Model  for  protecting  e- 
Government services in Tanzania is reported. The 
technical  and  non-technical  security  threats  that 
impact  delivery  of  e-Government  services  have 
been identified. The model design process followed 
the  ISO/  IEC  27002  security  standard  and  was 
guided by a design science research methodology. 
The  proposed  secured  e-Government  maturity 
model is designed by including the security layers 
which  consist  of  technical  and  non-technical 
security related aspects in each of its four maturity 
stages.  The model can be applied as an information 
security  checklist  for  e-Government  services 
development activities such as planning, analysis, 
design,  implementation  and  maintenance.    The 
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organizations  can  achieve  secure  e-Government 
services. Further research work to test and validate 
the proposed model into one of the earlier studied 
organizations is recommended. 
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